Stockpile reports series#

Nuclear Weapons Stockpileįurther undercutting DTRA’s case, the U.S. Despite DTRA’s assumptions about sensitivity, changed circumstances should make it possible to declassify the earlier data. Today’s locations might be the same as those in 1997, but it would be surprising if they were the same as in 1967 or 1977, for example. Moreover, the locations of weapons have greatly changed. Worth keeping in mind is that the small weapons stockpile of 1947 (mostly bombs) was profoundly different from the much larger stockpile of 1967 (a wide variety of bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, anti-submarine weapons, etc.) or the much smaller one of 2017. Yet, would there really be any risk from declassifying most details about the quantities, types, and locations of U.S. After all, DTRA might argue, information about the numbers and types of weapons is classified under the category of formerly restricted data (FRD), which concerns military applications of nuclear energy (e.g., yields of weapons, stockpiles, tactics).

Stockpile reports series#

If, however, DTRA does not have an ISOO file series exemption, 80 years could be in breach of federal regulations.ĭTRA may argue that because the reports are so sensitive that they are unlikely to be declassified, even those from the early Cold War. If it has, DTRA has at least minimal support for its argument for 80 years, but that does not change the overall bad picture. It is not clear whether the Information Security Oversight Office has given DTRA a declassification exemption for this collection of reports. (In recent years, NARA has been considering other inappropriate records schedules proposals – see here and here for more.) For example, it far exceeds the 50 years given to the CIA to transfer its operational files, which are very likely more sensitive than the weapons inventory. It is likely that DTRA took the initiative in requesting 80 years (much less likely that NARA would have suggested it), but the 80 years that NARA granted is unwarranted and without precedent.

Also merged into DTRA in the late 1990s was the On-Site Inspection Agency, which had responsibility for verifying arms reduction agreements such as the 1987 INF Treaty. In chronological order, the agencies that led up to DTRA were the Armed Force Special Weapons Project, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency. nuclear weapons stockpile and its reliability (a task shared with the Department of Energy), DTRA is the successor to a series of agencies. The reports, prepared since 1947, contain information on the “the quantity, location, and status of US Nuclear Weapons.” In its responsibility to maintain the U.S. This ill-advised action is contrary to the public interest as well as to NARA’s mission and its organizational interests. The reports created during 1957 will not transferred until 2042, and so on. Thus, stockpile reports created in 1947 will not go to NARA until 2032. Under the disposition plan, the reports will be transferred to NARA in five-year blocs 80 years after the last year of the block. nuclear weapons stockpile for 80 years or more after they were created. According to the National Archives Request for Records Disposition Authority, DTRA can retain custody of its reports on the U.S. Last year, the National Archives and Records Administration approved an outrageous request by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).